University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law
2018

MAPPING AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: VARIATIONS ACROSS THE
50 STATES: Chapter One: Distributive Principles of Criminal Law
Paul H. Robinson
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Tyler Scot Williams
University of Pennsylvania Law alumnus

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the American Politics Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminology and Criminal Justice
Commons, Legislation Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Public Law and
Legal Theory Commons, Public Policy Commons, Regional Sociology Commons, and the Social Control,
Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons

Repository Citation
Robinson, Paul H. and Williams, Tyler Scot, "MAPPING AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: VARIATIONS ACROSS
THE 50 STATES: Chapter One: Distributive Principles of Criminal Law" (2018). Faculty Scholarship at Penn
Carey Law. 2002.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2002

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law by an authorized administrator of Penn
Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Mapping American Criminal Law
Variations across the 50 States
Paul H. Robinson and Tyler Scot Williams

—-1
—0
—+1

Robinson_2nd pass.indd 3

5/9/18 5:59 PM

Contents

Preface

xi

Acknowledgments

xv

Part One Preliminary Issues: Punishment
Theory and Legality
Chapter 1

Distributive Principles of Criminal Law

3

Chapter 2

Habitual Offender Statutes

20

Chapter 3

Death Penalty

27

Chapter 4

Legality Requirement

36

Part Two Homicide
Chapter 5

Provocation/Extreme Emotional Disturbance

45

Chapter 6

Felony Murder

53

Chapter 7

Causation

64

Part Three Liability Doctrines
Chapter 8

Transferred Intent

77

Chapter 9

Consent to Injury

85

Chapter 10

Mental Illness and Culpability

92

Chapter 11

Attempt

99

Chapter 12

Complicity

109

Chapter 13

Complicity Liability of Coconspirators

118

Robinson_2nd pass.indd 7

5/9/18 5:59 PM

—-1
—0
—+1

viiiContents

Part Four

Justification Defenses

Chapter 14

Lesser Evils/Necessity Defense

131

Chapter 15

Self-Defense

141

Chapter 16

Law Enforcement Authority

150

Part Five

Excuse Defenses

Chapter 17

Insanity Defense

159

Chapter 18

Immaturity Defense

171

Part Six Nonexculpatory Defenses
Chapter 19

Statute of Limitations

181

Chapter 20

Exclusionary Rule

187

Chapter 21

Entrapment Defense

193

Part Seven Offenses against the Person
and Property
Chapter 22

Criminalizing Risk Creation

201

Chapter 23

Statutory Rape

207

Chapter 24

Domestic Violence

214

Chapter 25

Stalking and Harassment

221

Chapter 26

Child Neglect

227

Chapter 27

Deceptive Business Practices

233

Chapter 28

Extortion

239

Part Eight Public Order and Decency Offenses
Chapter 29

Adultery

249

Chapter 30

Criminal Obscenity

253

Chapter 31

Child Pornography

261

Part Nine

-1—
0—
+1—

Offenses against the Community

Chapter 32

Drug Offenses

271

Chapter 33

Firearms Possession Offenses

277

Chapter 34

Predatory Pricing

283

Robinson_2nd pass.indd 8

5/9/18 5:59 PM

Contents 

ix

Chapter 35

Organized Crime

289

Chapter 36

Fixing Sporting Events

296

Part Ten Procedural Issues
Chapter 37

Extradition

305

Chapter 38

Jurisdiction

310

Index

319

—-1
—0
—+1

Robinson_2nd pass.indd 9

5/9/18 5:59 PM

Preface

It is common for criminal law scholars from outside the United States to discuss the “American rule” in order to compare it to the rule of other countries.1
As this volume makes clear, however, there is no such thing as an “American
rule.” Each of the states, plus the District of Columbia and the federal system,
have their own criminal law; t here are 52 American criminal codes.
American criminal law scholars know this, of course, but they too commonly
speak of the “general rule” as if it reflects some consensus or near consensus
position among the states. But the truth is that the landscape of American criminal law is one of almost endless diversity, with few, if any, areas in which t here
is a consensus or near consensus. Even most American criminal law scholars
seem to fail to appreciate the enormous diversity and disagreement among
the 52 American jurisdictions.
The best one can do in most instances is to talk of a “majority rule,” but
even this is extremely difficult business. Every jurisdiction recognizes a person’s right to defend himself or herself against unlawful force, for example.
But what is the “majority rule” in the United States in the formulation of that
defense? Jurisdictions disagree on a wide variety of issues within self-defense,
most prominently: (a) What constitutes the “unlawful force” that triggers a
right to use defensive force? (b) What temporal requirement must be met for
an actor’s conduct to be truly “necessary” at that time? (c) What amount of
force may be used? (d) When may deadly force be employed? (e) When may
an initial aggressor claim self-defense? (f) What is the legal effect, if any, of
the defendant provoking the encounter? (g) What is the legal effect of mutual
combat on self-defense? (h) Is t here a right to resist an unlawful arrest? (i) Is
there a duty to retreat from unlawful aggression before using deadly force?
There is disagreement among the states on every one of t hese issues.2
Further, as some of us have demonstrated elsewhere, even when the
research is done, it is not so easy to construct the majority American rule. To
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continue with the self-defense example above, not only do American jurisdictions disagree on each of the self-defense issues listed above, but the pattern
of states making up the majority view on each individual issue varies from
issue to issue. In other words, at the end of the day the “majority rule” for self-
defense in the United States is a rule that no jurisdiction actually adopts.
It is necessarily a composite of the American “majority rule” on each of the
sub-issues.3
Unfortunately, there has been little work done to map the enormous diversity among the states, perhaps because it is an extremely burdensome project,
in part for the reasons just noted. Every legal issue requires a major research
project investigating the criminal codes and/or case law of all 52 American
jurisdictions, and a single legal doctrine may have a half-dozen sub-issues
that must each be separately resolved.
Although the paucity of such diversity research is understandable, it is
nonetheless regrettable, for it is the m
 atters of disagreement that often point to
the most interesting issues for scholars. Why is it that there is disagreement
on a particular point? Why hasn’t a consensus formed? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the each of the alternative positions such that none
have won the day? Or, is it that the alternative positions have been perpetuated simply out of an ignorance by the legislatures of the disagreements among
the states? That is, does diversity exist not because of genuine disputes about
which position is best but rather b
 ecause the conflicting positions are not
readily known?
This volume is meant to raise awareness of the enormous diversity among
the states on issues across the criminal law landscape, to document this diversity with a host of specific illustrations on a wide range of issues, to encourage criminal law scholars to investigate these and the many other points of
disagreement that exist among the states, and to encourage each legislature to
look to this new diversity scholarship and to the positions taken by other states
when the legislature sets out to codify or recodify its criminal law (or to
encourage judges to do the same in those jurisdictions that continue to allow
judicial criminal law making4).
In each of the next 38 chapters, we examine different areas of American
criminal law and identify the major groupings among the states on an issue
in each area. This is hardly a comprehensive list of the issues on which t here are
disagreement; it is only a representative sampling. Indeed, we know of no
area of American criminal law on which there is not disagreement among
the jurisdictions. The only American criminal law universal is its universal
diversity.
Nor are the points of disagreement that we map h
 ere the only points of
diversity within each of the issues that we examine. On the contrary, we
commonly pick one particular point of disagreement among the states that
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seems particularly interesting or important, but it is commonly only one of
many points of interstate disagreement relating to that aspect of criminal law.
For the issue that we take up in each chapter, we group all the American
jurisdictions according to the position they take. However, t here is such variety in approach that even jurisdictions within the same group commonly
take slightly different approaches (which we often attempt to document in the
Notes). Thus, even our groupings of states, usually three to seven groups on
each issue, understate the extent of American criminal law diversity.
Each chapter provides a map of the United States with each of the states
visually coded according to its approach to the issue. T
 hese maps, the reader
w ill see, often raise interesting hypotheses about geographic or other state
factors that might explain the patterns of agreement and disagreement (red
states versus blue states, rural versus urban, rich versus poor, West Coast versus East Coast, e tc.). At the end of each chapter we sometimes speculate about
the reasons for disagreements, but more importantly, our hope is that the
maps w
 ill pique the interest of scholars in many disciplines—political scientists, criminologists, criminal law scholars, and sociologists, among o thers—to
investigate alternative hypotheses about why we see the patterns of agreement and disagreement that we see.

Notes
1. For instance, it is common to speak of the “American rule” concerning the
duty to rescue and criminal liability for omissions. See, e.g., Peter M. Agulnick
and Heidi V. Rivkin, Criminal Liability for Failure to Rescue: A Brief Survey of French
and American Law, 8 Touro Int’l L. Rev. 93, 95 (1998) (referring to the “American
rule” that there is no duty to rescue); Christopher H. Schroeder, Two Methods for
Evaluating Duty to Rescue Proposals, L aw & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1986, at 181
(same); Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 423, 424 (1985) (same). Likewise, it is common to speak of an “American rule” in the context of the duty to retreat. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Any Which
Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes toward Violence in the Evolution
of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule,” L aw & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1992, at 303,
305 (referring to the “American rule” that a person has the right to “stand [her]
ground”); Jeannie Suk, The True W
 oman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31
Harv. J. L. & Gender 237, 243 (2008) (same); Joseph E. Olson and David B. Kopel,
All the Way Down the Slippery Slope: Gun Prohibition in England and Some Lessons
for Civil Liberties in America, 22 Hamline L. Rev. 399, 465 (1999) (same). The phrase
is often invoked by the courts. In the duty to retreat context, see, e.g., Cooper v.
United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1005 (D.C. 1986) (noting that jurisdictions which
follow the “American rule” permit a person to “stand [her] ground”) and Gillis v.
United States, 400 A.2d 311, 312 (D.C. 1979) (same).
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2. Paul H. Robinson, Matthew Kussmaul, Camber Stoddard, Ilya Rudyak,
and Andreas Kuersten, The American Criminal Code: General Defenses, 7 J. L egal
A nalysis 37, 51–57 (2015).
3. For a statement of such a majority rule for self-defense, see Robinson
et al., supra note 2, at 50.
4. See Chapter 4, concerning the legality principle, for a list of such
jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER ONE

Distributive Principles of
Criminal Law

What do we seek to achieve by imposing criminal liability and punishment?
What principles should govern? These may seem like academic questions, but
they are not. One cannot rationally and thoughtfully draft or interpret a criminal code, draft sentencing guidelines, or impose a criminal sentence without
knowing the answers to these questions. A drafter of criminal code or sentencing guidelines must make hundreds if not thousands of choices in formulating criminal law rules, and sentencing judges must make a large number of
discretionary judgments in determining the amount and method of punishment to impose in a given case. And each of t hese decisions can be affected by
the principle that the criminal justice system has a dopted for distributing
criminal liability and punishment.
Should criminal liability and punishment rules be set to match an offender’s moral blameworthiness for the offense—his just deserts? Or should they
be set to maximize the general deterrent effect of a criminal sentence on other
potential offenders? Or should liability and punishment be set according to
whether this offender w ill be dangerous in the future and seek to incapacitate
him or her during the time of greatest dangerousness?
Which of these principles a jurisdiction adopts as its guide in imposing
criminal liability and punishment w
 ill have a dramatic effect b
 ecause each of
these alternative principles w ill generate a quite different distribution. Each
w ill impose a different amount of criminal liability and punishment on a dif
ferent set of people. Consider two examples.
Should a jurisdiction adopt an insanity defense? If incapacitating dangerous offenders is the criminal law’s primary goal, then it certainly should not
have such a defense because the people shown to be dangerously mentally ill
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are exactly the people over which the criminal justice system wants to take
control. Punishing insane offenders would also send a useful general deterrent
message to other (noninsane) potential offenders, demonstrating how serious the
system is about punishing violators. A desert principle, in contrast, would
insist on exculpating offenders whose insanity renders them blameless.1
Another example illustrates that while deterrence and incapacitation princi
ples may agree on the insanity defense issue, they commonly disagree with
one another. Where an attempt fails by chance—the intended victim bends
down to tie his shoe at the moment before the assailant’s bullet is about to
strike his head—the incapacitation principle would punish the failed attempt
the same as a successful attempt b
 ecause the assailant is equally dangerous
in both cases, while a deterrence principle would want to punish the attempt
less seriously than the completed offense so as to maintain a continuing threat
of additional punishment to deter a follow-up attempt. If the failed attacker is
already fully liable, why w
 ouldn’t he try again?
If desert were the distributive principle in the attempted murder case, it is
unclear what the result would be under deontological desert: moral philoso
phers are divided over w
 hether the resulting death should increase the actor’s
punishment where his conduct and culpability are identical. On the other
hand, under what one might call “empirical desert,” the result is clear: ordinary p
 eople essentially universally agree that the resulting harm should
increase punishment, that murder should be punished more seriously than
attempted murder.
There are hundreds of issues like the insanity defense and the significance
of resulting harm about which alternative principles differ in their distribution of criminal liability and punishment.
Every jurisdiction in the United States, through constitutional provision,
statutory provision, state sentencing commission policy, or appellate court
opinion, gives some indication of the principle or principles that should be
used in constructing, interpreting, or applying its criminal liability and sentencing rules.2 States are free to adopt any distributive principle or combination of principles that they choose; there is no federal constitutional limitation
on their choice. As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in an Eighth Amendment
case before the U.S. Supreme Court, “there are a variety of legitimate penological schemes based on the theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, and the Eighth Amendment does not mandate the
adoption of any one such scheme.”3 And, as Map 1A makes clear, states have
exercised this right to choose in a wide variety of ways.

Desert as a Distributive Principle
Thirty states, designated with light shading on the map—Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
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York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming4—have determined that an offender’s desert, sometimes called “retributive justice,” should serve as one of t hose guiding purposes.
The principle is expressed in a variety of ways. Many jurisdictions hold that
sentencing should provide “just punishment,”5 or “deserved” punishment,6
or simply that punishment should satisfy or do “justice.”7 Occasionally, desert
is expressed in terms of “fairness,” as in a sentencing policy that directs courts
to administer “fair” punishment.8 Two jurisdictions express desert in terms of
“personal responsibility” and “accountability for one’s actions.”9 One jurisdiction
expresses desert in terms of “merited” punishment.10 Finally, a host of states simply refer to “punishment” as a goal in itself,11 a reference to desert by implication.
(This is consistent with the empirical evidence that ordinary people think of
“punishment” in desert terms rather than other distributive principle terms.12)
The remaining 21 jurisdictions, designated with medium shading on the
map—Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, West V
 irginia, and
Wisconsin13 —have not set desert as a part of their guiding principle for determining criminal liability and punishment.

Deterrence as a Distributive Principle
Twenty-six states, those with a dots overlay on the map—Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, V
 irginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming14 —have set or included deterrence
as a guiding principle for their criminal code or sentencing policy. This is
nearly always expressed by explicitly using the term “deterrence.”

Incapacitation as a Distributive Principle

-1—
0—
+1—

Thirty-two jurisdictions designated with an overlay of diagonal lines on the
map—Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West V
 irginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming15 —have
included incapacitation of the dangerous as part of their guiding principle.
This principle is expressed in a variety of ways. Only two states—Ohio and
Virginia—actually use the word “incapacitation” outside of the case law. Many
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statutes provide that sentencing should serve the purpose of “confinement,”
when necessary to prevent further crime.16 The same sentiment is often expressed
as “remov[ing]” dangerous offenders from society.17 Many statutes express the
goal in terms of “protection” of the public, such as providing imprisonment
“when required [for] public protection.”18 Incapacitation is also expressed in
terms of punishment that targets “dangerous,” violent, or repeat offenders, those
whose freedom “continues to threaten public safety.”19

Rehabilitation as a Correctional Policy
Forty-two jurisdictions—Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mas
sachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—have a dopted rehabilitation as a general purpose of their criminal code or sentencing policy. This is often expressed in
terms of “rehabilitation”20 or “reformation,”21 but occasionally in terms of “correctional” treatment22 or simply “treatment.”23 Some statutes speak of “improvement” of the offender, suggesting that punishment should “offer the offender
an opportunity to improve himself.”24 States may be very specific about correctional programming, for instance, providing that sentences should provide
the defendant with “educational or vocational training.”25 Finally, a number of
states express rehabilitation in terms of reducing the rate of “recidivism” or the
“risk of reoffending.”26
Although rehabilitation is a popular purpose, it stands in a quite different
position than the distributive principles of desert, deterrence, and incapacitation discussed above (which is why it has not been included on the map).
There is no jurisdiction that has ever sought to use rehabilitation of the offender
as its central principle in deciding who should be punished and how much.
Rather, it is classically used not as a distributive principle for criminal liability
and punishment at all but rather as a matter of correctional policy.27 That is, no
state sets its length of prison term according to that which w ill be needed to
rehabilitate the offender—no prison for t hose who do not need rehabilitation
or cannot be rehabilitated; and a lengthy prison sentence, even for a minor
offense, for those who need rehabilitation that w ill take some time. But most
states, such as the 42 explicitly mentioning rehabilitation in one form or
another, do want to take the opportunity to rehabilitate an offender during
whatever term of imprisonment or noncustodial control has been set by reference to one of the three primary alternative distributive principles of desert, deterrence, or incapacitation of the dangerous.
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Restorative Justice as an Adjudicative Process
A number of states have in one way or another expressed the importance
of what some have termed “restorative justice,” which emphasizes restoring
the offender to the community by encouraging the offender to repair broken
relationships and satisfy debts, particularly those caused by the criminal conduct. This may be expressed as “restoration,”28 “healing,”29 “restitution,”30 or
simply “restorative justice.”31
However, restorative justice is not a distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment but rather an alternative adjudication and sentencing
process, one which commonly involves bringing together the offender, the victim, their family and friends, and members of the community to decide or
recommend an appropriate disposition of the case. There are a great variety of
restorative processes, some involving larger groups and some smaller groups.
What they have in common is an open discussion, out of the glare of official
court rules, where the entire group—some form of this process is called a “sentencing circle”—can try to develop an appropriate disposition that w ill help
to both reintegrate the offender and make whole the victim.
Such restorative processes can be very useful and effective, but they are
not “distributive principles” for criminal liability and punishment. It is rather
the shared judgments of justice of those p
 eople in the sentencing circle that
w ill shape the disposition, not any sort of articulated principle.32 As a practical matter, restorative processes are likely to generate results that track a princi
ple of empirical desert: the empirical evidence is clear that ordinary people
think about criminal liability and punishment in desert terms,33 but nothing
in the restorative processes typically demands adherence to this or any other
distributive principle.

Variations on a Desert Distributive Principle and Related Rules

-1—
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Ordinary p
 eople’s strong support for a desert distributive principle may
be part of the explanation for why the American Law Institute (ALI) approved
the first-ever amendment to its Model Penal Code in which it dropped the
approach of its original 1962 draft that had encouraged states to consider a
laundry list of distributive principles. The Model Penal Code was extremely
influential and became the basis for recodifications in three-quarters of the
states in the decades following its promulgation. It is the original approach of
the Model Penal Code that probably accounts for the range of distributive
principles cited by so many jurisdictions, as represented in Map 1A. In its
2007 amendment, however, the Model Penal Code rejects this laundry-list
approach in favor of a revised Section 1.02(2) that sets desert as a dominant
distributive principle that can never be v iolated.34
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How do the American jurisdictions differ in their commitment to the desert principle? As Map 1A shows, 30 of the states adopt desert as a distributive
principle, although as the map also shows, many of t hose states also recognize
alternative distributive principles that can conflict with desert. Without designating desert as the dominant principle, then, desert may be sacrificed to
promote general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous.
Map 1B shows the extent of each American jurisdiction’s commitment to
the desert principle. In some instances, desert is not recognized as a distributive principle but some component of desert is given formal approval, such
as requiring proportionality between the seriousness of the offense and the
offender’s punishment. In some jurisdictions, while not committing to the distributive principle of desert, the authorities at least speak to the endpoint of
the desert continuum: they expressly provide that blameless offenders ought to
be protected from criminal liability and punishment.

Desert Distributive Principles: Deontological and Empirical
Twenty states, designated with no shading on the map—Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming35 —have determined
that desert is a guiding purpose of the criminal code or sentencing policy.
Ten other states, shown with no shading but an overlay of dots—Alabama,
Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Washington 36 —similarly adopt desert as a distributive principle but specifically refer to desert as reflected in shared judgments
of the community. As noted above, this has been referred to as “empirical desert” in order to distinguish it from the notion of “deontological desert” derived
from moral philosophy. Empirical desert is most reliably based on the research
of social psychologists who seek to determine the governing principles that
ordinary people have in their heads and use in determining their judgments of
justice, as compared to deontological desert, which is derived from logical
reasoning, classically by moral philosophers. (Empirical research has shown
that there is an enormous amount of agreement on basic principles of justice
across demographics, at least with regard to the core of wrongdoing.37)
A jurisdiction’s adoption of empirical desert as a distributive principle is
expressed in a number of ways. Some codes state that punishment is the public’s “condemnation” of, or its “appropriate response” to, the offender’s conduct.38 Sometimes empirical desert is expressed in terms of holding the
offender “accountable” to the community39 or of vindicating public norms.40
Some jurisdictions simply state that punishment ought to “promote respect for
the law.”41
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The remaining 21 jurisdictions do not openly recognize desert as a distributive principle. However, most of them at least recognize some component
of desert—that is, recognize e ither a principle of proportionality between the
seriousness of the offense and the seriousness of the punishment, or make some
effort to protect the blameless from criminal liability and punishment, or both.

The Principle of Full Offense Proportionality
Seven states, shown with light shading on the map—Delaware, Indiana,
Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, and West V
 irginia42—do not
include justice or desert as a guiding principle. However, they have adopted a
principle of proportionality between the seriousness of the punishment and the
seriousness of the offense. (A desert distributive principle would go further and
would take into account not just the seriousness of the offense harm but also the
offender’s culpability, excuses, and mitigations. In other words, a desert princi
ple would require proportionality between not just the offense harm but the
overall blameworthiness of the offender and the seriousness of the punishment.)
A common way of expressing the adoption of such an offense proportionality requirement is to call for punishment to “differentiate” between “serious
and minor offenses,”43 or that punishment be “proportioned”44 or “commensurate”45 with the nature or harm of the offense.

Full Offense Proportionality Plus Protecting the Blameless
Four states, designated with light shading and an overlay of diagonal
lines—Florida, Montana, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania46 —go beyond an
offense proportionality rule to also specifically adopt a provision that a blameless person should be exempt from punishment. Such a provision only adopts
the endpoint of the desert principle: it protects the blameless from punishment
but does not require that the extent of punishment should otherw ise track
the extent of an offender’s blameworthiness.
States in this category commonly “limit the condemnation of conduct as
criminal when it is without fault”47 or “safeguard conduct that is without fault
from being condemned as criminal.”48 Although the states in this group fall
short of a full desert principle, they do better in approximating desert than any
other nondesert group.

A Partial Offense Proportionality Principle
Four jurisdictions, shown with medium shading on the map—District of
Columbia, Georgia, Nevada, and Utah49 —have a dopted a weaker form of the
offense proportionality rule, stating that punishment simply ought to take
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account of the “seriousness,”50 “severity,”51 or “gravity”52 of the offense.53 That
is, the directive is satisfied simply by taking account of the offense seriousness in some way; it does not require that the punishment be proportionate
to the offense seriousness.

Partial Offense Proportionality Plus Protecting Blameless
One state, Illinois, with medium shading on the map plus an overlay of diagonal lines, has a dopted a partial offense proportionality rule54 and a provision
that the system o ught to avoid punishing blameless offenders.55 By explicitly
providing for the protection of blameless persons, Illinois does better than the
group immediately above but still leaves itself far away from a desert principle.

No Proportionality and No Protection of the Blameless
Five states, designated with black shading on the map—Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Vermont, and Wisconsin56 —have not adopted desert, justice, offense
proportionality, or even protection of the blameless as a distributive principle.

Observations and Speculations
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It seems clear from the maps above that most jurisdictions have not yet
caught up with the ALI’s adoption, in its 2007 amendment to the Model Penal
Code, of desert as the inviolate distributive principle. Why this gap between
the historically influential ALI and current authorities in the states?
Part of the responsibility no doubt falls on the ALI itself. From its initial
promulgation in 1962 until its amendment in 2007, even the Model Penal
Code urged states to adopt a laundry list of alternative distributive principles
that allowed code and sentencing guideline drafters and individual sentencing
judges to sacrifice just deserts to promote other distributive principles, typically
crime control through general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous.
But the intervening years have revealed much about the limitations of deterrence and incapacitation principles, as well as revealing the crime control
benefits of a criminal law that promotes justice rather than sacrifices it to
deterrent and incapacitation goals. There is an enormous literature on the subject, but some of the key findings might be summarized this way.57
Generally, deterrence has the potential to be an enormously efficient crime
control mechanism. By punishing a single offender, one can send a deterrent
threat to hundreds or even thousands of potential offenders that could be just
the t hing to change their mind about committing a contemplated offense. General deterrence does work at least in the sense that having a criminal justice
system that imposes punishment for violations is likely to have an effect on
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 eople’s decisions to commit crimes. What does not work is using general
p
deterrence to formulate criminal law and sentencing rules—that is, to use it
as a distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment, such as to
decide whether to provide an insanity defense, whether to grade attempts the
same as the substantive offense, or hundreds of other specific criminal code
or sentencing decisions.
For general deterrence to work effectively as a distributive principle, at least
three conditions must be present. First, the intended target must know about
the deterrence-based rule—the treatment of the insanity defense and the grading attempts. But the reality is that the target audience rarely knows the law.
Second, even if they do know the law, the target audience must be rational
calculators who w
 ill take that information into account and alter their conduct to most effectively promote their own interests. Yet, the reality is that
most in the target audience are commonly highly irrational in their thinking
because of the influence of drugs, alcoholism, impulsiveness, m
 ental or emotional disturbance, or a host of other factors. Finally, even if the target audience
knows the law and are rational calculators, they w ill not be deterred by
the threat of criminal punishment unless their calculations lead them to conclude that the costs of the contemplated offense outweigh the benefits. Yet
the conviction and punishment rates are so low and the threatened punishment so remote that, in comparison to the immediate benefit of the contemplated offense—such as a robbery that w
 ill produce the money to immediately
buy drugs—the target audience is more likely to conclude that the benefits of
the offense outweigh the costs.58
Making a general deterrence distributive principle even less attractive is
the fact that t here is already a general deterrent effect in the punishment threatened by a desert distributive principle. If a deterrence-based principle is to
provide significantly greater deterrent effect, it can do so only by means of deviating from desert, as in doing injustice, which the empirical desert research shows
can incrementally undercut effective crime control. Thus, even if one could gain
some greater deterrent effect by d
 oing injustice, which may be a rare opportunity, even that greater deterrent effect may be outweighed by the system’s loss
of crime control effectiveness that comes from its loss of moral credibility with
the community.
In contrast, an incapacitation distributive principle does in fact work. Putting an offender in prison, for example, w
 ill prevent the offender from committing other offenses—at least against persons not in prison. The problem,
however, is that clinicians have a limited ability to reliably predict who w
 ill
in fact be dangerous in the future. Making things worse, the “criminal justice” system seems to feel obliged to look like it is d
 oing justice for past offenses
rather openly admitting that it is a preventive detention system whose only
focus is future offenses. Thus, it tends to cloak its preventive detention to look
like criminal justice by focusing not so openly on clinical assessments of future
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dangerousness but instead on factors like past criminal record. In most sentencing guidelines, for example, an offender’s prior criminal history may count for
much more of the resulting sentence than the offense actually committed, on
a theory that past criminality predicts future criminality. Unfortunately, that
focus further weakens the accuracy of the future dangerousness prediction.
The ultimate effect is seriously high false-positive rates—predictions of f uture
dangerousness that are in fact false—that have the effect of wasting correctional
expenditures and unjustifiably intruding in the lives of the detainees.59
At the same time, empirical studies have suggested that there is not just a
deontological virtue in following a desert distributive principle—doing justice is good in itself that requires no other justification—but also that it has a
significant crime control benefit. Criminal justice systems that are seen as regularly doing injustice or regularly failing to do justice, especially when t hese
deviations from desert are predictable results of the system’s criminal law
rules, are systems that are likely to provoke subversion and resistance. In contrast, a criminal justice system that earns a reputation as being devoted to
doing justice above all else—to giving people the punishment they deserve,
no more and no less—is a system that is likely to inspire greater cooperation,
acquiescence, and deference. And, perhaps most importantly, a system that
has earned a reputation for moral credibility—as being a reliable authority of
what is and is not truly condemnable—is a system that is more likely to lead
people to internalize its norms. It is also a system that has the power of its
moral credibility to help shift community norms when needed.60
Notice that these crime control benefits of a desert distribution flow not
from a distributive principle of deontological desert derived from the reasoning of moral philosophers. Instead, the crime control benefits of a desert distribution flow from criminal law building moral credibility with the community,
primarily by setting criminal liability and punishment distributive rules that
track the shared judgments of justice of ordinary p
 eople.61 As noted earlier,
this “empirical desert” is recognized as a distributive principle only in 10
states. And even then, most of those states allow other distributive principles
to be promoted at the expense of empirical desert.
Although the case for desert as the dominant distributive principle is
strengthening, it w
 ill no doubt take a long time for t hese truths to percolate
down into the political conversations that influence the formulation of the
distributive principles that govern criminal codes, sentencing guidelines, and
the calculations of individual sentencing judges.

Notes
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1. For a more detailed discussion of how these alternative distributive princi
ples differ, see Paul H. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law: Who
Should Be Punished How Much? at 7–20 (Oxford 2008).
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2. Ala. Code § 13A-1-3; Ala. Code § 12-25-2; Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.81.100;
Alaska Const. art. I, § 12; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-101; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-101.01; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801; Cal. Penal Code § 1170; Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 18-1-102; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-102.5; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 54-300; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 201; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 6502; D.C.
Code Ann. § 3-101; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.012; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-1-2; Haw. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 706-606; Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2521; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/1-2; Ind. Const. art. I, § 18; Ind. Const. art. I, § 16; Iowa Code Ann. § 901.5;
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6601; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.007; La. Stat. Ann. § 15:321;
Me. Const. art. I, § 9; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 1151; Md. Code Ann., Crim.
Proc. § 6-202; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 211E, § 2; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 769.33a; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.01; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 364.01; Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 558.019; Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission—P urpose and Goals, Missouri
Sentencing Advisory Commission (last accessed Sept. 13, 2017), http://w ww
.mosac.mo.gov/page.jsp?id= 45401 (stating that official purpose of sentencing
commission is to ensure “proportionality of punishment”); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45-1-102; Mont. Const. art. II, § 28; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-102; Neb. Const.
art. I, § 15; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § SB 451, § 6; N.H. Const. Pt. 1, art. XVIII; N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:61-a; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-2; N.Y. Penal Law § 1.05; N.C.
Const. art. XI, § 2; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 164-42.1; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 16441; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1-01-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.11; Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 181.24; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 234; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
§ 1514; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.025; Or. Const. art. I, § 15; 18 Pa. Stat. and
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 104; R.I. Const. art. I, § 8; 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-19.31; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-101; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102; Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-103; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.02; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104; Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 7030; Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-801; Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 9A.04.020; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.010; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5; State
v. Broughton, 196 W. Va. 281, 292, 470 S.E.2d 413, 424 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (interpreting the constitutional requirement of
proportionality to include incapacitation); Wyo. Const. art. I, § 15; Bear Cloud
v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶ 63, 275 P.3d 377, 402 (stating that the four legitimate
goals of penal sanctions are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation). Five states—Mississippi, New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin—have not codified general purposes as to criminal law or sentencing, either by statute, commission policy, or constitutional provision. For
these jurisdictions, court decisions guide sentencing policy. See Taggart v. State,
957 So. 2d 981, 994 (Miss. 2007) (adopting principles of rehabilitation, retribution, “separation from society,” and deterrence); State v. Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074,
¶ 28, 133 N.M. 782, 789, 70 P.3d 772, 779 (“[T]he traditional aims of punishment [are] retribution and deterrence.”); State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 35,
148 N.M. 1, 10, 229 P.3d 474, 483 (“[U]nlike the adult criminal justice system,
with its focus on punishment and deterrence, the juvenile justice system reflects
a policy favoring the rehabilitation and treatment of c hildren.”); State v. Tucker,
324 S.C. 155, 174, 478 S.E.2d 260, 270 (1996) (recognizing incapacitation and
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rehabilitation as proper goals of sentencing); State v. Fletcher, 322 S.C. 256, 260,
471 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing “punishment” per se as a
proper goal of sentencing); State v. Talla, 2017 S.D. 34, ¶ 14, 897 N.W.2d 351,
355 (stating that retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are
legitimate penological goals); State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 416, 565 N.W.2d
506, 514 (1997) (holding that the primary considerations in assigning punishment are the offender’s rehabilitative needs and the interests of deterrence and
incapacitation).
3. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2683, 115
L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
4. See supra note 2.
5. Alabama (“just and adequate punishment”), Arizona (“just and deserved
punishment”), Connecticut (“just punishment”), Hawaii (“just punishment”),
Massachusetts (“punish the offender justly” and “provide just punishment”),
Virginia (“just criminal penalties”), and Washington (“punishment which is just”).
See supra note 1.
6. Arizona (“just and deserved punishment”), Colorado (“a sentence [the
offender] deserves”), and Tennessee (“justly deserved”). See supra note 2.
7. North Carolina (“satisfy justice”), Oklahoma (do “justice”), and Rhode
Island (“do justice to the victim [and] the offender”). See supra note 2.
8. Connecticut (“fair, just, and equitable”) and Maryland (“fair and proportional”). See supra note 1.
9. Oregon (“personal responsibility, accountability for one’s actions”) and Kentucky (“hold offenders accountable”). See supra note 2.
10. North Dakota (“merited punishment”). See supra note 2.
11. California, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas. See
supra note 2.
12. See Paul H. Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and Utility of Desert, Part I (The
Nature of Judgments about Justice) (Oxford 2013); Robinson, Distributive Princi
ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapters 7 and 8.
13. See supra note 2.
14. See supra note 2.
15. See supra note 2.
16. Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, and Oregon. See supra note 1.
17. Arizona (“remove from society persons whose conduct continues to threaten
public safety”), Arkansas (“protect the public by restraining offenders”), and Tennessee (“[restrain] repeat offenders”). See supra note 1.
18. Alabama, Colorado (“provide [punishment] when required in the interests of public protection”), Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma
(“incarceration [is] a punishment and . . . a means of protecting the public”), and
Vermont (courts should consider “the risk to self, others, and the community at
large presented by the defendant”). See supra note 2.
19. District of Columbia (punish with “due regard for the . . . d angerousness of the offender”), Hawaii (“protect the public from further crimes of the
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defendant”), Idaho (imprisonment imposed when there is an “undue risk [that]
defendant w ill commit another crime”), Iowa (“protection of the community from
further offenses by the defendant and o thers”), Kansas (goal “that dangerous
offenders shall be correctively treated in custody for long terms as needed”), Mary
land (imprisonment for “violent” or “career” criminals), Massachusetts (“protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant”), Nebraska (“subject to public
control persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit
crimes”), Nevada (target offenders with “predatory or violent nature,” who “must
receive sentences which reflect the need to ensure the safety and protection of
the public”), New Jersey (“subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit offenses”), Ohio (“protect the public from
future crime by the offender”), Tennessee (“[restrain] repeat offenders”), Virginia
(“due regard . . . to the dangerousness of the offender”), and Washington (“reduce
the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community”). See supra note 2.
20. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas (“rehabilitation and restoration to the community”), California, Colorado, Connecticut (“rehabilitation and reintegration”),
Delaware (“rehabilitation and restoration [as] useful, law-abiding citizens within
the community”), District of Columbia, Florida (“opportunity for rehabilitation”),
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina
(“rehabilitation and restoration”), South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin (address “rehabilitative needs”). See supra note 2.
21. Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, and Wyoming. See supra note 1.
22. Hawaii (“correctional treatment”), Idaho (“correctional treatment”), Kansas (“[corrective] treat[ment]”), and Maryland (“[correction] options . . . for appropriate criminals”). See supra note 1.
23. Vermont. See supra note 2.
24. Kentucky (“improv[e] outcomes for . . . offenders”) and Washington (“offer
the offender an opportunity to improve himself or herself”).
25. Hawaii (“provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment”) and Massachusetts (“provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training”). See supra
note 2.
26. Kentucky (“reduc[e] recidivism and criminal beh avior”) and Washington (“reduce the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community”). See supra
note 2.
27. See generally Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 1,
Chapter 5 (Rehabilitation).
28. Arkansas, Colorado, and Delaware. See supra note 2.
29. Colorado. See supra note 2.
30. For instance, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Tennessee have all incorporated restitution into their general purposes statutes.
See supra note 2.
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31. California, Colorado, and Missouri. See supra note 2.
32. See generally Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 1,
Chapter 9 (Restorative Justice).
33. See Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and Utility of Desert, Part I (The Nature of
Judgments about Justice) (Oxford 2013); Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapters 7 and 8.
34. Robinson, Distributive Princi
ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1,
Chapter 11.B.
35. See supra note 2.
36. See supra note 2.
37. See Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and Utility of Desert, supra note 1, Chapters 1 and 2.
38. Alaska (“community[’s] condemnation of the offender”), New Jersey (“condemn conduct [that hurts the] public interests”) and New York (“provide appropriate public response to particular offenses”). See supra note 2.
39. Connecticut (“[hold] the offender accountable to the community”). See
supra note 2.
40. North Dakota (“ensure the public safety . . . through the vindication of public
norms by the imposition of merited punishment”) and Oklahoma (“demonstrate . . .
that the offender’s conduct is unacceptable to society”). See supra note 2.
41. Alabama, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Washington. See supra note 2.
42. See supra note 2.
43. Delaware. See supra note 1. This formulation is also adopted by a number
of desert jurisdictions, including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See supra
note 2. But the breadth of the desert principle makes up for the limitations of the
proportionality principle by itself.
44. Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, and West V
 irginia.
See supra note 2. This formulation is also adopted by some desert jurisdictions,
including Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Rhode
Island, and Washington. See supra note 2. But the breadth of the desert principle
makes up for the limitations of the proportionality principle by itself.
45. This principle is adopted by Arkansas, a desert jurisdiction. Arkansas policy is that punishment ought to be “commensurate” with the nature of the
offense, “taking into account factors that may diminish or increase an offender’s
culpability.” See supra note 1. But the breadth of the desert principle makes up
for the limitations of the proportionality principle by itself.
46. See supra note 2.
47. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Illinois have a dopted the formulation,
though none of the four full proportionality states have adopted it. See supra note 2.
48. Florida (“safeguard conduct that is without fault . . . from being condemned
as criminal”); Montana (“safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal”); Nebraska (“safeguard conduct that is without fault and which
is essentially victimless in its effect from condemnation as criminal”); Pennsylvania (“safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal”).
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See supra note 2. Some desert states have also adopted a similar provision: North
Dakota, Texas, and Washington. See supra note 2.
49. See supra note 2.
50. The District of Columbia (“due regard for the . . . seriousness of the
offense”), Georgia (“prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of the crimes”), Illinois (“prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the
seriousness of offenses”), and Utah (“proportionate to the seriousness of [the]
[offense]”) use this language. See supra note 2. A number of desert and full proportionality jurisdictions use the language of seriousness: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Tennessee, Texas, V
 irginia, and Washington. See supra note 2.
51. Nevada (“[impose] sentences that increase in direct proportion to the severity of [the] crimes and [the] histories of criminality”). See supra note 2.
52. One full proportionality jurisdiction has also adopted this partial proportionality formulation: Maine (“[impose] sentences that do not diminish the gravity of offenses”). See supra note 2.
53. Note that one full proportionality jurisdiction—Pennsylvania—has also
adopted a kind of partial proportionality provision, with a purpose to “safeguard
offenders against excessive, disproportionate[,] or arbitrary punishment.” See
supra note 2.
54. See supra note 47.
55. Illinois (“limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault”). See supra note 2.
56. See supra note 2.
57. See generally Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 1.
58. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapters
3 and 4.
59. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapter 6.
60. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapter 7.
61. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapter 8.
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